Lenin's death and Kirov's assassination; these include the Princeton group around Robert C. Tucker and his most brilliant student Stephen Cohen, as well as the leading Leninist dissident among Soviet historians, Roy Medvedev. Thirdly, there is the position of those who whole-heartedly endorse the events of October 1917 and feel obliged to defend almost all that followed as both necessary and desirable; like their antagonists in the first group, they see no basic divisions in the policies of the CPSU under Lenin and Stalin, but of course they regard that as a good thing; their number is made up of all official Party historians as well as a much smaller number of independent (though rarely mainstream) scholars like the Columbia-trained Szymanski.
The place to begin, obviously, is the October Revolution itself. Unlike its predecessor of February 1917, its spontaneity and popularity were called into question immediately, and on all sides, including within the Bolshevik ranks themselves. Only very recently has there been any support in western scholarship for the longstanding Soviet claim that October was a genuine proletarian revolution, and not merely a Bolshevik coup d'état. to what followed in the wake of that revolution as proof of its undemocratic nature. In this regard, the actions which have come under the greatest fire have been the dispersing of the Constituent Assembly, the formation of the secret police (Cheka), the separate and humiliating Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the banning of opposition parties (including the moderate socialists), forced grain requisitions and strictly centralized control over industry, a burgeoning Party bureaucracy at the expense of the Soviet system of government, and finally a policy of state terror against "counterrevolutionaries." To be sure, there were extenuating circumstances. The new Soviet state was surrounded by enemies, and the survival of the revolution was in jeopardy throughout this first period. Furthermore, many of Lenin's measures were conceived of as temporary and were to be reversed as soon as the emergency passed, much in the way that martial law is used in similar situations in the west. But the tragedy, as some loyal Leninists like Roy Medvedev recognize, cannot be explained away entirely on that basis. Lenin's leadership and especially his relativistic notion of morality as nothing more than a reflection of the Party's needs were also major contributing factors. Even Medvedev is prepared to concede that Lenin's theory "on the overall organization of socialist production and distribution" 9 was faulty and, under the circumstances, inevitably led him to alienate the bulk of the peasantry, polarizing Soviet society with the excesses of War Communism. lariat and his proximity, on both ideological and cultural grounds, to the general party membership."
All of this
In any event, Stalin's victory came in three stages: first, the outflanking of both the Left and the Right Oppositions within the Politburo; then the brutal collectivization and rapid industrialization of the "revolution from above" in 1929-30; and finally, the blood purges of 1936-39. Medvedev's explanation for the whole phenomenon is ad hom'mem: it was all "prompted by Stalin's inordinate vanity and lust for power: he was determined to be in a position of absolute control."* Medvedev does mention Mikhail Agursky's theory that the purges were a kind of popular revenge against the Old Bolshevik intelligentsia of "foreigners and Jews." There is unfortunately something to this notion; it barkens back to another great peasant leader, Emilian Pugachev, who also came from the south, knew how to tap the elemental roots of popular revulsion against an elitist westernizing "court" and its esoteric and costly notions of social engineering, and would be king. Surely it is not an accident that of all the top contenders for power at Lenin's death, Stalin stood out least from the common man. His opponents mistook that bland exterior for a lack of intelligence, and they were dead wrong.
Yet the questions remain about his qualifications for leadership, his ideology and programme, and, most of all, his tactics and motivations. In one sense the answer to all these questions is obvious. But if centralized organizational principles were one thing, surely Stalin's "revolution from above" and the purges were quite another. Even at his most highhanded moments it is difficult to imagine Lenin undertaking the latter policies or carry ing them to such unconscionable extremes. Therefore The chief problem with Szymanski's approach, apart from his highly selective use of sources -none are in Russian, and he simply ignores the few which do not conform to his conclusions -is a certain nominalism which seems to be characteristic of all sides of the debate. For instance, Szymanski seems quite satisfied that as long as "wage labour is [not] the primary form by which the producing population is exploited by the owning and controlling class," 17 and that by definition is so in the Soviet Union, it cannot be capitalism. Is it not more important to determine whether exploitation occurs in the Soviet Union in 14 The term "social imperialist" may be taken to mean imperialism clothed in socialist and fraternal rhetoric. It has become the favourite Chinese term of abuse for the Soviets. In its essentials, Soviet foreign policy has been defensive, its chief concern to protect Soviet territory from attack. Like its imperial Russian predecessor, the Soviet Union regards contiguous states, especially on its western and southern frontiers, as part of its basic security zone. This is the main reason why, despite binding mutual defence treaties, the Soviets did not intervene militarily in the Korean and Vietnamese conflicts, but have done so in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and, most recently, Afghanistan. A secondary motivation has been the concept of "proletarian internationalism," that is, solidarity with the working-class movement throughout the world. Szymanski, however, would have it the other way around. According to his view, the reforms of the Prague Spring, for example, were essentially economic and not really political or civic. Once again he relies on Soviet and related sources which see the Dubcek regime as representing the vested interests of a new managerial, economic élite at the expense of the Czech working class. If true (and it does not seem to be so on the face of it), this would constitute some ideological grounds for the Soviet action, although Szymanski is forced to acknowledge that the intervention was not widely popular in Czechoslovakia. Memories in eastern Europe are not short; 20 years earlier it was a very similar line that Stalin used to try to discredit the Tito leadership in Yugoslavia. The Brezhnev Doctrine, thus, is nothing very new, but it has made more explicit the limits upon the sovereignty of all countries within the Soviet Bloc, and, much like the American Monroe Doctrine, is an attempt to pre-empt the intervention of anyone else. The logic of the argument rests on a bipolar vision of the world, which, in turn, may be traced back to Lenin's other famous dictum that those who are not with us are against us. 
